Creditor\u27s Rights - The Fourteenth Amendment Held to Require Notice and Hearing Prior to Any Repossession of Consumer Property by Means Involving State Action by Ruberry, Edward F.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 3
Issue 2 Summer 1972 Article 16
1972
Creditor's Rights - The Fourteenth Amendment
Held to Require Notice and Hearing Prior to Any
Repossession of Consumer Property by Means
Involving State Action
Edward F. Ruberry
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago
Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward F. Ruberry, Creditor's Rights - The Fourteenth Amendment Held to Require Notice and Hearing Prior to Any Repossession of
Consumer Property by Means Involving State Action, 3 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 451 (1972).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol3/iss2/16
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS-The Fourteenth Amendment Held
to Require Notice and Hearing Prior to Any Repossession
of Consumer Property by Means Involving State Action.
Mrs. Margarita Fuentes, a Florida resident, purchased a stove and
service policy from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company under a
conditional sales contract. The contract called for monthly payments
over a period of time.
Several months later, Mrs. Fuentes purchased a stereo from Fire-
stone under the same type of installment contract. The total cost of
the stove and stereo was approximately $500.00, plus an additional
finance charge of over $100.00. Under the two contracts, Firestone
retained title to the merchandise, but Mrs. Fuentes was entitled to pos-
session unless, and until, she should default on her installment pay-
ments.
For over a year, Mrs. Fuentes faithfully met her payments, but with
only about $200.00 remaining to be paid, a disagreement developed
between her and Firestone over the servicing of the stove.
Firestone then instituted a repossession action in a Florida small
claims court and, simultaneous with the filing of the action, obtained
a writ of replevin for the disputed goods by merely submitting the ap-
propriate form documents to the small claims court and having the
documents stamped by the court clerk. Later the same day, a deputy
sheriff and an agent of Firestone went to Mrs. Fuentes' home and,
persuant to the writ, seized both the stove and stereo.
Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Fuentes instituted an action in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Florida prejudgment replevin procedures under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. She sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief against continued enforcement of the provi-
sions of the Florida statutes which authorize prejudgement replevin.
A three judge district court rejected Mrs. Fuentes' constitutional
claim on the ground that due process did not require notice and hear-
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ing prior to seizure of goods which were not necessities of life.' The
district court based its holding on its interpretation of Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.2
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the prejudge-
ment replevin provisions of Florida law were valid under the four-
teenth amendment.
In a 4 to 3 decision,3 the Supreme Court reversed the Florida dis-
trict court.4 The majority, per Justice Stewart, held the Florida law
violative of the fourteenth amendment since it works a deprivation of
property without due process of law by denying the possessor of chat-
tels the opportunity to be heard before the chattels are seized.5
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's reading of Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp. The district court had reasoned that Snia-
dach established no more than that a prior hearing is required with
respect to the deprivation of "necessities" of life.6 The Supreme Court
found that this reasoning evidenced too narrow a reading of Sniadach,
and maintained that Sniadach was "in the mainstream of past cases,
having little or nothing to do with the absolute 'necessities' of life but
establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before
a deprivation of property takes effect. '
Before commenting fully on the Fuentes decision it is appropriate at
this point to consider carefully the Sniadach decision and two cases,
Goldberg v. Kelly8 and Bell v. Burson9 decided subsequent to Snia-
dach which had applied the Sniadach holding.
A study of Sniadach, Goldberg and Bell may assist in explaining the
difference of opinion which arose between the district court and the
Supreme Court in Fuentes regarding the proper reading of Sniadach.
More importantly, it will clarify the significance of the Fuentes holding
by determining whether Fuentes is merely a routine application of
Sniadach, a logical expansion of the Sniadach holding, or a dramatic
leap forward by the Supreme Court in the area of debtor's constitu-
tional rights.
1. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
2. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
3. Mr. Justice Stewart, who announced the majority opinion, was joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall. Mr. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion
in which Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined. Mr. Justice Powell
and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
4. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
5. Id. at 2002.
6. Id. at 1998.
7. id.
8. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
9. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., the plaintiff had instituted a
garnishment action against the defendant Sniadach and her employer
as garnishee. Under the Wisconsin Garnishment Act,"° earned but
unpaid wages of a debtor could be frozen by a creditor's suit. The
employer-debtor was given neither notice of the action nor an oppor-
tunity to contest the creditor's actions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
had rejected the defendant's contention that the act violated due proc-
ess. The court reasoned that if a reasonable opportunity to be heard
were given at some stage of the proceeding, due process had not been
violated."
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court and concluded that the prejudgement procedure had deprived
the debtor of property without due process of law.' 2  The Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Douglas, emphasized that the property
that had been seized were the debtors' wages-" . . . a specialized type
of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system."' 3
Focusing on the importance of wages, the Court cited a report pre-
pared by Congressman Sullivan, Chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on Consumer Affairs, as illustrating the grave injustices made pos-
sible by prejudgement garnishment. Mr. Justice Douglas felt that this
"type of procedure could drive a wage earning family to the wall."' 4
In view of the devastating effect any deprivation of wages, no matter
how temporary, has upon an individual, the Court held that due proc-
ess required notice and hearing prior to the garnishment.
The Court's characterization of wages as a "specialized" type of
property appeared to be significant in an analysis of Sniadach. It
seemed to imply a distinction between "special" property and "other"
property-a distinction which provided "special" property with a
greater standard of protection under the due process clause.
Subsequent to the decision in Sniadach, the Court's ruling in Gold-
berg, v. Kelly15 appeared to support this limited interpretation of Snia-
dach. In Goldberg, welfare recipients brought suit, alleging that offi-
cials administering the relevant welfare programs had terminated, or
were about to terminate, their aid without prior notice and hearing,
10. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 267.01-.24 (Supp. 1970).
11. 37 Wis.2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1968). The Wisconsin Supreme Court es-
sentially relied upon MeInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), for its
decision.
12. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
13. Id. at 340.
14. Id. at 342.
15. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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thereby denying them due process. The Supreme Court concluded
that due process did, in fact, require "an adequate hearing prior to
the termination of welfare benefits."'16
The Court recognized that a denial of welfare payments could de-
prive a recipient of the funds needed for subsistence. In this respect,
the Court's view of welfare benefits was analogous to its characteriza-
tion of wages as "specialized" property, and, therefore, their termina-
tion required more than summary procedures. Thus, although the
Goldberg opinion seemed to expand the ruling of Sniadach to include
property other than wages, the Court had again emphasized the unique
hardships incurred by an individual upon deprivation of this type of
property.
Similarly, in Bell v. Burson," the Supreme Court ruled that the revo-
cation of a driver's license may require prior notice and hearing when
the license is vital to the driver's profession. 18 In this decision the Court
again emphasized, as it had in Sniadach and Goldberg, the importance
of the property interest in question to the individual concerned. The
driver's license was absolutely necessary for the driver, here a minister, to
perform the duties of his profession.
The cummulative impact of these decisions by the Court seemed to
indicate conclusively the distinguishing element of the property pro-
tected by the holding in Sniadach was that the property interest in-
volved was essential to one's existence,'" and its deprivation resulted
in grevious loss.
It was this interpretation of Sniadach which led the three judge fed-
eral district court to conclude that the property involved in Fuentes, a
stove and a stereo, were not within the scope of protection provided
by Sniadach. Because the items of property were not absolute ne-
cessities of life, they were not "special" property. 20
The Supreme Court's opinion in Fuentes made it clear that the
principle of Sniadach was not to be expressed in terms of "special"
property. The Court maintained that the district court's reading of
Sniadach and Goldberg was much too narrow, and that both decisions
were ". . . in the mainstream of past cases, having little or nothing to
do with 'necessities' of life but establishing that due process requires
454
16. Id. at 264.
17. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
18. Id. at 539.
19. Id.
20. See Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
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an opportunity for a hearing before a deprivation of property takes
effect."'"
Conceivably, the Court could have found that the property involved
in Fuentes was "special" property within the meaning of Sniadach.
It chose, however, to extend the prior notice and hearing provisions of
Sniadach to any consumer property subject to the Florida replevin law.
In this respect, the Court noted that:
While Sniadach and Goldberg emphasized the special importance
of wages and welfare benefits, they did not ... carve out a rule
of necessity for the sort of non-final deprivations of property that
they involved. . . . If the root principle of procedural due process
is to be applied with objectivity, it can not rest on such distinctions.
The fourteenth amendment speaks of "property" generally. . . . It
is not the business of a court adjudicating due process to make its
own critical evaluation of those choices and only protect ones that
* . . are "necessary.
'22
Consistent with this principle, the Court concluded that the issue
presented by Fuentes was not the nature of the property seized, but
rather, whether the replevin statute was constitutionally defective by
failing "to provide for hearings 'at a meaningful time.' "23 In the
Court's opinion, Justice Stewart quickly noted that the right to be
heard is absolutely basic to due process. Its purpose is to insure that
the individual's possession of property is free from "arbitrary encroach-
ment" by the government.24 From this basic premise, the Court's
conclusion logically followed-in order to fulfill its purpose, the right
to be heard ". . . must be granted at a time when the deprivation can
still be prevented." 25  Quoting a recent case, Justice Stewart firmly
asserted that the Court had never" . . . embraced the general proposi-
tion that a wrong may be done if it can be undone."26
The Court also specifically refuted the arguments offered in support
of the Florida replevin statute. The requirement that the creditor post
a bond prior to the issuance of the writ was viewed as a minimal de-
terent-if a deterent at all-and in any event, is "no substitute for an
informed evaluation by a neutral official."2 7  Similarly, the possibility
21. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
22. id. at 1998, 1999.
23. Id. at 1994.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
27. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. at 1995, 1996. The Court did, however, admit
that property may be seized without notice or a hearing in certain extraordinary cir-
cumstances. Those seizures must be: (1) in order to secure an important govern-
mental or public interest; (2) where very prompt action was necessary; (3) and
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that the deprivation may be only temporary was of no significance in
determining the debtor's rights. The fact that the debtor may post a
bond and recover his goods, or may be successful on the underlying
contract dispute will be factors in determining the form of the hearing,
but is not "decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some kind."2
Finally, even though Mrs. Fuentes lacked full legal title to the goods,
the Court found that her right to "continued possession" was a "signifi-
cant property interest" sufficient for due process protection.29
Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackman,
dissented. 0 In Justice White's view, the majority had ignored the in-
terests of the creditor in the property.
But in these typical situations, the buyer-debtor has either defaulted
or he has not. If there is a default, it would seem not only "fair"
but essential, that the creditor be allowed to repossess; and I cannot
say that the likelihood of a mistaken claim of default is sufficiently
real or recurring to justify a broad constitutional requirement that
a creditor do more than the typical state law requires and permits
him to do. 31
As a practical matter, Justice White's view may be an accurate assess-
ment of the typical repossession situation. However, the majority's
ruling in Fuentes did not neglect the creditor's interest in the property,
not unduly burden his protection of that interest. The Fuentes holding
does not prevent the repossession of the goods, nor does it provide the
debtor with a defense to the creditor's claim of right to repossession.
It merely affords the debtor the opportunity to contest the creditor's
claim prior to the seizure of the goods.
Thus, despite the Court's insistence that it had never existed, it ap-
pears that the "Sniadachian" "special" property concept for determin-
ing what constitutes a deprivation of property without due process has
been abandoned. An important, although academic, question is what
influenced the Court to abandon a doctrine adopted only three years
where the state "has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force." As
examples, the Court noted collection of taxes, the needs of a war effort, misbranded
drugs and contaminated food. Id. at 2000.
28. 92 S. Ct. at 1997.
29. Id. at 1997.
30. As well as disagreeing with the majority on the merits of the case, Justice
White also felt that the judgment should be vacated in light of Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger decision requires that federal court interference
in state court proceedings is allowed only when bad faith or harrassment is present
and irreparable injury is likely to result. Because proceedings were pending in the
state court, it appears that Justice White was of the opinion that the district court, in
the exercise of sound discretion, should not have acted. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct.
at 2003.
31. Id. at 2004.
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earlier. A possible answer lies in the Blair v. Pitches3 2 decision.
In Blair, the plaintiffs brought an action to declare the California
claim and delivery law unconstitutional. The provisions of the Cal-
ifornia law were substantially identical to the Florida replevin law chal-
lenged in Fuentes. The California Supreme Court concluded that the
seizure of property persuant to the claim and delivery law constituted
a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The California Court found that many of the items of property
seized under the claims and delivery law were "special" property with-
in the scope of the Sniadach decision. Numerous other items subject
to seizure could not be considered necessary to one's existence, and,
therefore, their seizure did not require prior notice and hearing. Real-
izing the difficulties encountered in any attempt to fairly and effective-
ly enforce this distinction under the statute in question, the court con-
cluded that:
It is not possible for us to narrow the law's scope solely to consti-
tutional applications without completely redrafting its provisions;
nor can we eliminate its unconstitutional features by merely excising
certain clauses. Instead, in order to create a constitutional prejudg-
ment remedy there must be provision for a determination of prob-
able cause by a magistrate and for a hearing prior to any
seizure. .... 33
The very same situation would be presented under all prejudgment
seizure statutes as applied to consumer goods. Furthermore, even once
it were established that notice and hearing would be granted to all
debtors whose "special" property was about to be seized, the task of
determining which property was "special" still remained. As a prac-
tical matter the dichotomy between "special" property and other prop-
erty in the consumer area was simply impracticable.
An interesting and very important issue alluded to in the Fuentes
case, but not decided by the Supreme court is the validity of a waiver
of rights clause. The resolution of this issue will determine the ulti-
mate effect of the Court's ruling in Fuentes. If a purchaser, by sign-
ing a typical installment sales contract containing a waiver of rights
clause, is held to have validly waived his right to notice and hearing
prior to the repossession of the goods upon default, the Fuentes de-
cision will indeed be of small import in the consumer area.
32. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242 (1972).
33. Id. at 283, 486 P.2d at 1259, 1260. See also Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
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The appellees in Fuentes had argued that Mrs. Fuentes had waived
her constitutional right to notice and hearing. The Supreme Court
rejected that argument on the grounds that the language in the con-
tract relied upon by the appellees was not a waiver of rights. Rather,
the Court found that the contract provisions allowing the seller to "re-
take" or "repossess" the property on default were merely a "restate-
ment of the seller's right to possession upon occurrence of certain
events." 4 In order to even be considered a waiver, the language must
specifically refer to the buyer's right to a hearing prior to repossession.
The Court did indicate, however, that it may impose very rigid
standards upon any attempt by the seller to secure a waiver of the
purchasers rights. Justice Stewart pointedly contrasted the facts of the
Fuentes case with those of D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 5 in which
a contractual waiver of rights was sustained. The contract involved
in Overmyer was between two corporations. Overmyer, had, through
its attorney's negotiations, offered to waive its rights in return for a
more favorable contract terms. The Supreme Court ruled that Over-
myer had knowingly and intelligently waived its rights to notice and
hearing prior to judgment. In summarizing its decision in Overmyer,
the Supreme Court stressed that the facts of the case were important,
and indicated that, under a different set of facts, its ruling may be
quite different.36
Consistent with the warning contained in Overmyer, the Court's
discussion of waiver in Fuentes placed so much emphasis on the factual
differences between Overmyer and Fuentes (facts typical to most in-
stallment sales contracts), that there is little doubt in which direction
the Court is leaning.
The facts of the present cases are a far cry from those of Overmyer.
There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the parties
who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining power. The
purported waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales con-
tract and a necessary condition of the sale. The appellees made
no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware or
made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon
as a waiver of constitutional rights.3 7
The Court then cited from its decision in Overmyer that "where the
contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity of bargain-
34. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. at 2002.
35. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
36. Id. at 188.
37. 92 S. Ct. at 2002.
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ing power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the waiver pro-
vision, other legal consequences may ensue. '38  This strong dicta by
the Supreme Court indicates what the ultimate resolution of the issue
will be.
CONCLUSION
Justice White, in his dissent, protested the effect he foresees of
Fuentes in the Uniform Commercial Code.31 It is impossible to ig-
nore the probable impact Fuentes will have on the default and repos-
session sections of the Code.40 Indeed, even prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Fuentes, a federal district court had held this sec-
tion of the Code unconstitutional. 4 '
In Adams v. Egley42 the United States District Court for Southern
California struck down the default and repossession possession proce-
dure of the California Commercial Code as a deprivation of property
without due process of law.
There, plaintiff George Adams borrowed one thousand dollars from
the Bank of La Jolla, executing a promisory note and a security agree-
ment in favor of the bank. The terms of the security agreement pro-
vided that, should the debtor fail to make payment of any part of the
principal or interest as provided in the promissory note: "[T]he Se-
cured Party shall . . .have all the rights and remedies of a Secured
Party under the California Uniform Commercial Code, or other ap-
plicable law."43
Some time after the execution of the note, defendant Southern Cal-
ifornia First National Bank became the successor in interest to the
Bank of La Jolla.
Alleging the plaintiff had fallen behind on his payments, the de-
fendant Egley, acting for the bank, took possession of two of the
three vehicles which served as security under the agreement. They
were both subsequently sold by the bank at a private sale.
Employing reasoning similar to that used by the Supreme Court in
Fuentes, the Adam's court found, that at a minimum, the due process
clause required notice and a hearing prior to any repossession of prop-
38. 405 U.S. at 188.
39. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. at 2005, 2006 (1972).
40. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503, 504.
41. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 616.
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erty where state action was involved. In Adams the creditor had ar-
gued that no state action was involved because the contract terms pro-
vided for repossession on default, and were merely self executing.
The court, however, rejected this argument on the grounds that sales
contract, which gave the creditor "all the rights and remedies of a
Secured Party under the California Uniform Commercial Code",44 set
forth a state policy encouraging creditors to deprive debtors of their
property under color of State law. The court based this conclusion on
the rationale set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Reitman v.
Mulkey.45
In that case, pursuant to initiative and referendum the California
constitution was amended to prohibit restrictions on an individual's
right to sell property. The Court found that the provision enacted as
a repealer of California's antidiscriminatory housing legislation, ac-
tually served as state encouragement of private discrimination. Thus,
even though the parties to the controversy were private individuals the
court found: . . . the mere enactment of the statute constituted suf-
ficient state involvement to bring the alleged discrimination within the
purview of the fourteenth admendment. 6
The Adams case presented an analogous situation. Although the
respossessions complained of were ostensibly private acts pursuant to a
contract, the significant impact of Sections 9-503 and 9-504 on the
transaction can hardly be doubted. 7  Thus the Adams court stated:
It is therefore apparent that the acts of repossession were made
"under color of state law", as required by the Civil Rights statutes,
and the passage of Sections 9-503 and 9-504 are sufficient state
action to raise a federal question.48
Under the reasoning of the Adams court, it would appear that any
sales contract which incorporates the repossession sections of the Code
would involve sufficient state action to require the notice and hearing
rights established by Fuentes. Furthermore, although Justice White
indicates that a contract that provides for repossession without resort
to judicial process will avoid the application of the Fuentes ruling,4 9
the reasoning of the Adams court is compelling.
However, these trends and prospective developments initiated by the
44. Id.
45. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
46. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. at 617 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 618.
49. 92 S. Ct. at 2005.
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Fuentes decision may never materialize. Neither Justice Powell nor
Justice Rehnquist took part in the Fuentes case, and conceivably they
may provide the dissenters, the Chief Justice and Justices White and
Blackman, with the votes necessary to become a majority on the is-
sues yet unresolved by Fuentes.
Nevertheless, the ruling in Fuentes v. Shevin is a significant step
forward in defining the rights of debtors, and provides the courts with
a powerful tool for the protection of consumers.
EDWARD F. RUBERRY

